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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-3662

REMOTE SOLUTION CO., LTD.,
Appellant
v.
FGH LIQUIDATING CORP.,
formerly known as Contec Corporation

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-0004
(Honorable Sue L. Robinson)

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 8, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, RENDELL and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 2, 2009)

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Remote Solution Co., Ltd. appeals from the District Court’s denial of its motion to
vacate or modify an arbitral award. The underlying dispute involves an agreement

between Remote Solution and Contec Corporation.1 The arbitrator determined Remote
Solution had agreed to defend and indemnify Contec against certain patent infringement
claims brought by third parties and awarded damages to Contec, as well as fees and costs.
The District Court denied Remote Solution’s motion to vacate or modify the arbitral
award and entered judgment for Contec. We will affirm.
I.
Remote Solution is a Korean electronics manufacturer. In February 1999, it
entered into a Manufacturing and Purchase Agreement [“Agreement”] with Contec, a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York. Contec sold
remote-control devices to consumers and cable television providers. The agreement
governed the production and sale of such devices according to specifications provided to
Remote Solution by Contec. Section 3(c) of the Agreement states that Remote Solution
would defend certain suits against Contec and indemnify Contec against damages:
Seller shall defend any suit or proceeding brought against Purchaser to the
extent that such suit or proceeding is based on a claim that the Products
constitute an infringement of any valid United States or foreign patent,
copyright, trade secret or other intellectual property right and Seller shall
pay all damages and costs awarded by final judgment against Purchaser.

1

Prior to this dispute, Remote Solution Co., Ltd. was Hango Electronics Co., Ltd.
During the dispute, Contec changed its corporate name to FGH Liquidating Corp.
Throughout this opinion, we refer to the parties and their predecessor and successor
corporations as Remote Solution and Contec, respectively.
2

One of the devices Contec purchased under the agreement was the RT-U49C.
Contec sent specifications for the device and placed an order in the spring of 2000.
About two years later, Universal Electronics, Inc. (“UEI”) sued Contec for patent
infringement in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, claiming the
RT-U49C infringed its patents. The parties settled in May 2002. That same year, Philips
Electronics North America and U.S. Philips Corporation (collectively “Philips”) sued
Contec, also in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, claiming the
RT-U49C infringed its patents.2 In June 2003, Contec and another defendant entered into
a Consent Judgment and Order stating they infringed two Philips patents. Contec
incurred fees and costs in its defense against both patent-infringement claims. In
resolution of the claims, it paid a settlement and royalties to both UEI and Philips.
Remote Solution’s failure to defend and indemnify Contec against the UEI and
Philips actions prompted Contec to withhold payment from Remote Solution for devices
shipped in January 2003. In June 2003, Remote Solution filed a complaint in Korean
court, seeking payment for the devices. In response, Contec demanded arbitration with
the American Arbitration Association under Section 19 of the Agreement,3 and

2

Philips also named Compo Micro Tech, Inc. and Seoby Electronics, two other Contec
suppliers, along with Remote Solution as defendants in the suit.
3

Section 19 of the Agreement states: “In the event of any controversy arising with
respect to this Agreement . . . such controversy shall be determined by arbitration . . . in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association . . . .”
3

subsequently filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York to compel arbitration. The arbitrator determined it had standing to hear the
dispute, the New York court entered judgment confirming the arbitrator’s standing,4 and
the parties proceeded to arbitrate their dispute.
In arbitration, Remote Solution claimed the indemnification provision did not
apply because Contec’s own specifications had caused the patent infringement. The
arbitrator, however, concluded Remote Solution had agreed to indemnify Contec in
Section 3(c) of the Agreement regardless of whether Contec provided its own
specifications. That provision, moreover, displaced N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-312(3), which
“[u]nless otherwise agreed,” would require a buyer who furnishes specifications to hold
the seller harmless against claims “aris[ing] out of compliance with the specifications.” 5
The arbitrator ordered Remote Solution to pay Contec $482,067.50. This figure
represents $1,102,105.50, which Remote Solution owes Contec under section IV(G) of
the Arbitrator’s damages award, reduced by $620,038, the amount Contec withheld from
Remote Solution for devices shipped in January 2003. Of the total amount, $295,833
represents Remote Solution’s share of the Philips and UEI settlement and royalties;6

4

Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., No. 1:03-CV-910, 2003 WL 25719933
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2003), aff’d, 398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2005).
5

The parties agree the contract is governed by New York law.

6

Remote Solution was only one of multiple companies that supplied devices to
Contec. The $295,833 award to Contec represents Remote Solution’s pro-rata share of
(continued...)
4

$270,206.32 is for Contec’s attorneys’ fees and expenses in the Philips and UEI actions;
$304,099.57 represents Contec’s fees and costs in the Korean and New York actions,
which the arbitrator determined were “clearly incurred in the conduct of this arbitration;”
and $231,966.62 is for Remote Solution’s share of Contec’s fees and expenses associated
with the arbitration itself.
Remote Solution filed a motion to vacate or modify the arbitral award in the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware. The District Court denied the
motion, and entered judgment for Contec.7 Remote Solution appeals.8
II.

6

(...continued)
the patent-infringement settlements and royalties.
7

The District Court also ordered Remote Solution to remit to Contec 75% of its
administrative costs and fees incurred in arbitration, and 25% of the arbitrator’s fee under
section IV(I) of the Arbitrator’s damages award. We assume the District Court
mistakenly ordered 25% of the arbitrator’s fee to be remitted to Contec, as opposed to the
75% stated in the aforementioned section of the Arbitration damages award. We correct
this typographical error; accordingly, Remote Solution shall remit to Contec 75% of its
administrative costs and fees and 75% of the arbitrator’s fee.
8

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although the case was
initially dismissed for failure to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement, Remote
Solution filed a renewed motion to vacate or modify the award. The renewed motion
asserted claims involving the arbitral award that were not certainly less than the amountin-controversy threshold. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,
289 (1938) (“It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.”); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v.
Tarbuck, 62 F.3d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1995). We have jurisdiction to review the appeal
from a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5

Review of arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1–16, is “extremely deferential.” Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs.,
Inc., 409 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 2005). We may disturb the award only when the
arbitrator is “partial or corrupt” or “manifestly disregards, rather than merely erroneously
interprets the law.” Id.9 Additionally, we may refuse to enforce an award that violates
law or a “well-defined and dominant” public policy. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seamen’s Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993). “[A] court’s refusal to enforce an
arbitrator’s interpretation of [a] contract[] is limited to situations where the contract as
interpreted would violate ‘some explicit public policy’ that is ‘well defined and dominant,
and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests.’” United Paperworkers Int’l Union
v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Remote Solution challenges the arbitrator’s determination that it had agreed to
defend and indemnify Contec against patent claims like the UEI and Philips claims.
Remote Solution contends the award violates public policy because the arbitrator’s

9

“[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and
acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious
error does not suffice to overturn his decision.” United Paperworks Int’l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). The typical result, which is “to affirm easily the arbitration
award,” is consistent with the purpose behind the FAA. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d
365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003).
6

interpretation of the contract did not comport with proper principles of contract
interpretation.10 (Br. of Appellant at 16 (citing Sweeney v. Hertz Corp., 704 N.Y.S.2d 19,
21 (N.Y.A.D. 1st Dep’t 2002) (requiring an indemnity provision in a car-rental contract to
“clearly and unequivocally express an intent to indemnify [the rental company] against its
own negligence”)). This argument suggests the arbitrator misconstrued the contract,11 not
that the contract “as interpreted,” see Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, would violate a well-defined
and dominant public policy. Remote Solution’s argument is that the arbitrator committed
legal error, but this is not a sufficient basis to determine the award violates public policy.
Remote Solution additionally contends the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the
law twice in its award of attorneys’ fees. First, it contends the arbitrator should have
limited the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the fees and costs it expended. Section
19 of the Agreement entitles the prevailing party “in any [arbitration] . . . to recover from
the other party all of its expenses, including, without limitation . . . its attorney’s fees
incurred in the conduct of such arbitration but in no event will the recovery of its
attorney’s fees be in excess of the actual cost of the other party’s attorney’s fees.” In the

10

The District Court concluded the arbitrator’s decision did not “constitute a ‘manifest
disregard for the law.’” Remote Solution Co. v. FGH Liquidating Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d
534, 542–43 (D. Del. 2008). On appeal, Remote Solution only challenges the
interpretation of the contract on public policy grounds.
11

We do not address whether this contention is correct, but note that the District Court
determined the arbitrator had not manifestly disregarded the law because the cases
Remote Solution relies upon do not clearly govern patent-infringement indemnification
clauses in New York.
7

arbitration, Contec reported $231,966.62 of fees, compared to only $13,581.11 of fees for
Remote Solution.12
The arbitrator acknowledged the contractual limitation on fees, but explained “it is
equally plain . . . that Remote Solution has breached its obligation of good faith and fair
dealing . . . .” Remote Solution’s fees were “unreasonably” and “inexplicably” low,13 the
arbitrator determined, and the “unusually low billings here cannot provide a basis for
negating the spirit of section 19” because Remote Solution had “arrang[ed] for the losing
party’s attorney’s fees and expenses to approach zero.” 14 The arbitrator considered the
contractual limitation as well as the good faith and fair dealing claims. By “construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,” Misco, 484 U.S. at 38,
the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law.
Remote Solution’s second argument is likewise unavailing. It contends under New
York law that the provision in Section 19 does not allow for recovery of pre-arbitration
attorneys’ fees and costs because it does not “unmistakably” address these costs. But the
arbitrator considered the language of the contract and determined these fees and costs

12

Remote Solution also contends the limitation on fees applies to the New York
action. In that action, it incurred $54,273.75 of costs, and Contec spent $288,779.30.
13

Contec had cited to more than thirty instances where Remote Solution’s counsel did
not bill for its time.
14

As noted, the arbitrator awarded $231,966.62 for fees incurred in arbitration, even
though Remote Solution claims to have incurred only $13,581.11. And the arbitrator
awarded Contec an additional $288,779.30 for its fees in the New York action, although
Remote Solution claims it only incurred $54,273.75 in that action.
8

were “incurred in the conduct of [the] arbitration.” Its determination was not in manifest
disregard of the law.15
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of the District Court and
remand for a determination of pre-judgment interest.16

15

Contec has also filed a motion for damages under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38. We will deny this motion. “If a court of appeals determines that an appeal
is frivolous, it may . . . award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”
Fed. R. App. P. 38. Damages under Rule 38 are within the discretion of the court and
awarded as justice requires. Beam v. Bauer, 383 F.3d 106, 109 (3d Cir. 2004); Hilmon
Co. (V.I.) Inc. v. Hyatt Int’l, 899 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1990). “[A]ttorneys have an
affirmative obligation to research the law and to determine if a claim on appeal [has
merit]. Beam, 383 F.3d at 109 (internal citations omitted). The test is whether a
reasonable attorney would conclude that the appeal is frivolous. Id.
Remote Solution’s appeal to this Court, although unsuccessful, contains colorable
claims. The arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law, but some interpretative issues
in the contract might have been reasonably construed in more than one way. While the
arbitrator’s decision receives great deference, Remote Solution’s appeal is not so lacking
in merit as to warrant a damages award under Rule 38.
16

Contec has renewed its request for pre-judgment interest beginning on January 25,
2006, which is the date the arbitrator ordered payment of the damages award. The
District Court did not address this issue.
9

